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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
CHAPTER II
TE OIL AND GAS LEASE
(I) The Evolution of the Lease.
The questions heretofore considered are general in their scope,
and were treated for the purpose of providing a background for
the more intensive study upon which we must now enter. While
commentators refer to this branch of jurisprudence as the "Law
of Oil and Gas," it is more exact to say that .we are dealing with
the law pertaining to oil and gas leases. This is true because the
oil and gas lease characterizes and distinguishes the subject through-
out. For reasons which inhere in the very nature of the business
a lease yielding the lessor a royalty on the quantity of oil or gas
produced creates the relation between the landowner and the opera-
tor which is best adapted to the practical aspects of the enterprise.
Accordingly, it is the almost universal custom to develop lands for
oil and gas under leases rather than through the ownership of the
fee. It'follows as a logical consequence that the subject-matter of
nearly all of the oil and gas cases is the oil and gas lease. In these
circumstances the problem of paramount importance to us is to
determine the nature and legal effect of this instrument.
Before coming to close quarters with the specific questions which
must be examined, there are certain practical aspects of the oil
business which must be taken into account. Broadly speaking, the
industry may be divided into two distinct periods of development,
each characterized -by methods, customs and usages essentially dif-
ferent from the other. Conditions prevailing in the earlier period
demanded the prompt development of a lease, or, in lieu thereof,
its forfeiture or abandonment. On the other hand, conditions of
the later period necessitated the holding of a large portion of the
prospective o4 territory as a reserve for future development, the
time and extent of development depending upon the success of like
operations in the vicinity, the lessor being compensated for the
delay by periodical money payments. This difference in the under-
lying methods and practices of the business is clearly reflected in
* This is the second instalment of a series of papers by Mr. Veasey. The first will
be found supra, p. 445.
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
the decisions of the two periods. Therefore, to distinguish these
cases accurately, and to confine each decision to its proper sphere,
it is of the highest importance to consider those contrasts in con-
ditions in detail.
For some years after the pursuit began in Pennsylvania opera-
tions were confined to a few counties in that state. Starting with
the first discovery, development progressed from one tract of land
to another with fairly uniform results. The general tendency then
was to restrict exploration to localities which were proven rela-
tively by neighboring production. Moreover, the wells were shal-
low and the cost of drilling comparatively small. In these circuim-
stances the financial risk incident to a test well was unimportant in
contrast with similar conditions today. Aside from this, the specu-
lative spirit was rampant, and the operator of that day was more
disposed to incur the hazard of development than is true of the
more conservative and businesslike operator of the present. Then
again, the leases of those times covered areas of very limited extent.
A typical lease would cover an acre of land, or less, and it was sel-
dom the case that a single holding exceeded five acres. Farms,
instead of 'being leased in their entirety, were subdivided for the
purpose of development. A lessee of the period ordinarily confined
his operations to a single lease until a failure resulted or until it
was fully developed, and it was only after this happening that he
contemplated another experiment. It was not the practice to pay
a bonus or initial cash consideration for a lease, and if paid, the
amount was wholly insignificant. Moreover, it was not the custom
then to provide for a rental payable to the lessor in default of devel-
opment. The only consideration moving to the lessor was a roy-
alty entirely dependent upon the success of the venture. The result
of these conditions was inevitable. The industry was then stamped
as one demanding the early development of all leases. This con-
clusion finds its absolute justification in the fact that in the period
between i86o and 1874 nearly every oil lease contained a provision
for the immediate commencement of operatioiis, "to be pursued
until success or abandonment," and to this was added a clause pro-
viding for the forfeiture of the lease upon the cessation of opera-
tions. In this atmosphere, implying speedy development in what-
ever circumstances, or, in default thereof, the immediate forfeiture
of the lease, the early oil eases were adjudicated. As expressive of
the early viewpoint of the courts, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania said:
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"The discovery of petroleum led to new forms of leasing
land. Its fugitive and wandering existence within the lim-
its of a particular tract was uncertain, and assumed cer-
tainty only by actual development founded upon experiment.
The surface required was often small compared with the
results, when attended with success; while these results led
to great speculation, by means of leases covering the lands
of a neighborhood like a flight of locusts. Hence it was
found necessary to guard the rights of the landowner as well
as public interest by numerous covenants, some of the most
stringent kind, to prevent their lands from being burdened
by unexecuted and profitless leases, incompatible with the
right of alienation and the use of land. Without these
guards, lands would be thatched over with oil-leases by
subletting, and a farm riddled with holes and bris-
tled with derricks, or operations would be delayed so long
as the speculator wouid find it hopeful or convenient to him-
self alone. Hence covenants became necessary to regulate
the boring of wells, their number and time of succession,
the period of commencemeut and of completion, and many
other matters requiring special regulation. Prominent
among these was the clause of forfeiture to compel per-
formance and put an end to the lease in case of injurious
delay or a wait of guccess. These leases were not valuable,
except by means of development, unlike the ordinary terms
for the cultivation of thi soil, or for the removal of fixed
minerals. A forfeiture for non-development or delay there-
fore cut off no valuable rights of property, while it was
essential for the protection of private and public interest in
relation to the use and alienation of property."1
Keeping in mind the fixed characteristics of the business in
those days, the courts dealing with these questions announced three
important legal principles applicable to oil and gas leases. Virst,
by reason of the fugitive tendency of the subject-matter dealt with,
great diligence in the development of an oil property was held to
be indispensable, and where the lease was silent as to the time and
extent of development, covenants or conditions to that effect were
implied. Second, urged by the same reason, the settled doctrine
that equity abhors a forfeiture gave way to the rule that where an
oil lease contained an -express forfeiture clause equity would enforce
the forfeiture in a proper case. Third, in harmony with the two
IBrown v. Vandergrift, So Pa. St. z42 (1875).
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principles just stated, the canon of construction that a grant should
be construed against the grantor and in favor of the grantee fell
before the judicial announcement that an oil and gas lease should
be construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee. Vhile
these principles were clearly applicable to the facts involved, much
of the confusion of judicial thought upon this subject, which will
be made plain as we proceed, is attributable to the utter failure on
ihe part of the courts in the newer oil states to recognize the exact
limitations of the earlier holdings. To establish the point of view
from which the real or apparent conflict in the cases must be con-
sidered, we must place the conditions of the later period of oil de-
velopment in strong contrast with the situation we have just de-
scribed.
It is impossible to fix with certainty the advent of the new con-
ditions which thereafter were to characterize the industry. By
1875, however, the oil business in America had attained such pro-
portions that its future as an important industrial enterprise seemed
secure. Men of broad vision, identified with the enterprise, began
to realize its possibilities. Its rapid growth in the preceding decade
had developed a group of operators of wide experience and large
capital who were prepared to engage in the pursuit up.on a far more
extensive scale than formerly. They no longer viewed the venture
as a purely speculative one, but regarded it as an established com-
mercial enterprise, and set about to adapt it to such conservative
methods as its peculiar nature would permit. The market for oil
and oil products was an expanding one, and the serious problem was
to provide and maintain a .upply of oil fairly equivalent to the cur-
rent demand. The situation thus presented" necessitated prudent
measures for the future. Accordingly, the custom of taking up
large numbers of leases, not for immediate development but to hold
against the necessities of the future, had its inception. Primarily,
this plan contenmplated the holding of lands under lease to be devel-
oped when operations in the vicinity reasonably justified the under-
taking, or where the demand for oil warranted wild-catting, regard-
less of surrounding conditions. To meet the situation of the lessor,
accustomed to prompt development, the medium of a rental clause
was employed. By virtue of this provision the lessor, in lieu of
development, received a money payment at stated intervals until
operations were commenced. Usually the rental clause was coupled
with a provision for forfeiture upon default in drilling or in the
payment of the prescribed rental. Moreover, the fixed duration of
the earlier leases, which usually ranged from twenty to ninety-nine
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years, gave way to a form of lease with a definite term, ordinarily
reduced to five years, with a proviso thereto that should production
be found within the fixed term the lease would continue in force as
long as oil or gas was produced. "About i88o the typical lease of
the period contained these important provisions in substance:
Habendum Clause
To have and to hold said lands for the purpose aforesaid for
a period of five years from date and as long thereafter as oil
or gas shall be produced in paying quantities.
"Drill or Pay" Clause
The lessee agrees to complete a well on said lands within one
year from date hereof, or in lieu thereof pay the lessor the sum
of One Hundred Dollars per annum until the completion of such
well: Provided, should the lessee fail or neglect to drill such
well or pay such rental as herein provided, the lessor shall have
the right to declare this lease forfeited.
The obvious effect of these provisions, when considered to-
gether, was this: The lease terminated at the expiration of the
fixed term unless, meanwhile, the lessee had developed the lands
and was producing oil or gas therefrom. The lease therefore could
,not be held, for an indefinite period without development. The
"drill or pay" clause enabled the lessee to defer drilling operations
throughout the fixed term by making the stipulated money pay-
ments, and a failure to drill or pay forfeited the lease. Occasion-
ally, where surrounding development justified this course, a lease
binding the lessee to immediate operations was entered into, but
the vast majority of leases then taken vested the lessee with the
alternative privilege of drilling or, instead, paying the prescribed
rental. In commenting on this situation the Supreme Court of West
Virginia said:
"These leases are drawn for all, sorts of territory, some
known to be rich in minerals and others not known to con-
tain any, and their terms are varied to allow for such dif-
ference. In territory remote from actual and profitable op-
eration leases are often taken without a reasonable expecta-
tion of any immediate advantage to the lessor other than a
rental in the form of delay money, and with the expectation
of delay in drilling until neighboring lands are shown to
contain the minerals, and the consequent establishment of
probability of the existence thereof in the leased premises." 2
2-South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, "7 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 96x (i9z2).
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In another case it is said:
"For we know, and may lawfully know, as all men know,
that vast areas are held by companies or organizations hold-
ing these leases for future use."
3
As a result of the new method of leasing, which involve6 the
payment of a rental, it was soon recognized that the operator could
not afford to pay the stipulated rental in any.-event and after the
land covered by the lease was condemned by development in the
vicinity. It was necessary to provide the lessee with a means of
escaping this obligation when the v alue of the leasehold, no longer
justified the payment of rentals. For a number of years after the
introduction of the rental clause, coupled with a provision for for-
feiture in the event of non-payment, both the lessors and lessees
in Pennsylvania were under the impression that a failure to pay
the prescribed rental by the lessee ipso facto terminated the lease
without further obligation on the part of the lessee to pay the
remaining rentals which ivould accrue during the fixed term. In
other words, it was then understood that the "drill or pay" clause,
supplemented by the forfeiture clause, already quoted here, enabled
the lessee to escape further rental payments by defaulting, in a sin-
gle payment. In 1889, however, Galey v. Kellernuzn' was decided
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It was there held that a pro-
vision for forfeiture in a "drill or pay" clause of the character al-
ready referred to was for the benefit of the lessor; that the lessor
upon default of the lessee to pay could insist upon the forfeiture
of the lease as stipulated therein, or waive the forfeiture and main-
tain assumpsit for all rental thereafter due within the fixed term
of the lease. Otherwise stated, the lessee was liable for all rentals
falling due within the fixed term of the lease at the option of the
lessor. Numerous suits for the recovery of rentals under leases
which had slumbered for years were then brought. The impor-
tance of the question to the operators of that period is clearly dem-
onstrated when we note that this precise point was before the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in eighteen different appeals before
the question was finally set at rest.5 The predicament of the opera-
tors of that day thus brought about necessitated a new invention to
relieve them from the obligation to pay-rentals when the value of
3Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 4.3.3. 26 S. E. 271 (x896).
4 Galev v. Kellerman. 123 Pa. 491. 16 At. 47, (88o).
'AO.eal of Wills, 1.1o Pa. 222. x8 Atl. 72r (x889)-: Westmoreland Gas Co. v.
DeWitt, 130 Penn. St. 235, 18 At!. 724 (x889); Ray v. Western Penna Gas.C&., 138 Pa.
576. 2o At. in6g (x8zQY: Agerter v. Vandergrift. x.8 Penn. St. .76. 2! At]. 202 (1891):
Ogden v. Hairy, 145 Penn. St. 640, 23 Atd. 334 (x892); Jamestown Ry. Co. v. Egbert,
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the property involved no longer justified that action. While some
of the leases of the earlier period contained a surrender clause, it
now became the universal practice either to insert a clause of this
description in the leases, or some equivalent provision. When the
"drill or pay" clause was used it then became customary to follow
this with a term vesting in the lessee the .ght to surrender the lease
at will. Coincident with this happening, and prompted by the con-
dition just described, the so-called "unless" clause in the oil and gas
lease came into existence. Instead of using a "drill or pay" pro-
vision qualified by the right to surrender residing in the lessee, the
following stipulation was employed:
"Provided, hpwever, that this lease shall become null and
void and all rights hereunder shall cease and determine
unless a well shall be completed on the premises within one
year from the date hereof, or unless the lessee shall pay at
the rate of $ioo per year in advaxice for each additional year
until such well shall be completed." 6
Under this provision the lease terminates ipso facto upon the
'failure to drill or pay, without further liability on the part of the
lessee for rentals thereafter accruing.7 Finally, then, it is to be ob-
served that two methods for the termination of a lease without fur-
ther liability for rentals'were the result of the condition just.de-
scribed. One was the employment of a surrender clause where the
affirmative covenant to drill or pay was utilized; the other contem-
plated the employment of the so-called "unless" clause.
Another practice connected with the taking of oil and gas leases
came into importance during this period-namely, the custom of
paying the lessor a bonus or initial cash consideration for the exe-
cution of the lease. It is manifest that when it was usual to stipu-
late for early development the payment of bonus was a rare occur-
IO -Pa. 53, 2S At. xsx (1892); Lethernaan v. Oliver, 1x5 Pa. 646, 2S At. 309 (1892);
Wilson v. Goldstein, IS2 Pa. .2.5. zs At. 493 (x89.3): Sanders v. Sharp. 1S. Pa. s.5. 25
At. 524 (x893); Gibson v. Oliver, i58 Pa. 277, 27 At. 961 (x893); Aderhold v. Oil Well
Sup ply Co., 158 Pa. 401, 28 At!. 22 (x893); McMil[an v. Philadelphia Co., xS9 Pa. 142,
a8 AtI. 22o (893); Cochran v. Pew, 159 Pa. 184. 28 Ad. 219 (893); Heinouer v.
Jones, 159 Pa. 228, 28 Ad. 228 (1893); Wolf v. Guffey, z61 Pa. 276, 28 At. x117 (1894);
Jackson v. O'Hara, 183 Pa. 233, 38 At. 624 (897).
4 Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co., 152 Pa. 48, 2S AUt. 232 (1892); Snodgrass v. South
Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 509. 3S S. E. 820 (1goo).
l Glasgow v. Chartiers Gas Co., supra; Snodgrass v. South Penn Oil Co., supra;
Butcher v. Green, 50 Ind. App. Ct. Rep. 692, 98 N. E. 876 (x9r2); VanEtten v. Kelly,
64 N. E. (Ohio, 1902) 56o; Chapple v. Kansas Vitrified Brick Co., 70 Kan. 723, 79 Pac.
666 (z905); Blodgelt v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 120 Fed. 893 (1903); Deming Investment Co.
v. Lanham, 36 Okla. 773, 130 Pac. 26o (1913); Leonard v. Busch-Everett Co., 239 La.
1099, 72 So. 749 (1916).
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rence. At that time the consideration moving to the lessor was the
obligation binding the lessee to operate. When, however, the pro-
vision for prompt development was qualified by the rental clause a
further inducement to the lessor was necessary. Naturaly, this
took the form of a money payment sufficient to bring about the exe-
cution of the lease, the amount depending upon the prospective
value of the land for oil and gas purposes and the degree of com-
petition between operators for leases in the particular vicinity. In
the last fifteen years the custom of paying a bonus has been almost
universal, and the practice is resorted to even where there is a posi-
tive obligation to drill within a stipulated time where the lands are
in the immediate neighborhood of development. In wild-cat terri-
tory the bonus usually paid is small, while in a district proven or
partially proven bonus payments frequently range frorr one hun-
dred dollars an acre to five thousand dollars an acre, depending
upon the possibility of the particular tract and the competition
among operators therefor.
Having reviewed the more important considerations which un-
derlie the business and which were incident to the acquiring and
developing of oil and gas leases, we are brought to the present.
While there are individuals and corporations now engaged in the
oil business attracted by the opportunity for great and sudden.
wealth only, the permanence of the industry is entirely dependent
upon that class of operators who make the pursuit their exclusive
business. Their activities extend to every known oil field. They
maintain highly trained organizations specially adapted to the
prosecution of the enterprise under any and all conditions. They
have a full appreciation of the utter uncertainty of the venture, and
yet devote and will continue to devote their capital and energies
thereto. Experience has convinced them that permanent success in
the business is possible only when the undertaking is founded upon
a lease which involves the following considerations: First, the
payment of a cash bonus to the lessor at the time of the execution
of the lease, the amount of this depending upon the prospective
value of the land involved, determined by competition among les-
sees for leases in the particular locality. Second, the lease to pro-
vide for a royalty payable to the lessor in the event the property
is drilled and success attends the operation. On oil the royalty is
a share of the production; on gas it is usually a fixed sum for each
well where the gas is utilized. Third, where geologic indications
are especially favorable, or where the land is in the immediate vicin-
ity of producing wells, the operator will sometimes bind himself to
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the positive obligation to drill a test well. Occasionally this obli-
gation is supplemented by a stipulation for the drilling of additional
wells if the test results in production. Fourth, this positive obli-
gation to drill, however, is exceptional, the typical lease containing
a provision for a fixed term of limited duration, the consequence
being that unless production is found within that term the lease
expires. Fifth, supplementing the provision for a fixed term is a
clause by virtue whereof the lessee has the option either to drill a
test well or, in lieu thereof, pay a periodical rental within the defi-
nite term. Thus, if the obligation to drill or pay rises to the dig-
nity of an affirmative covenant to do one or the other, a surrender
clause is annexed. If not, the "unless" clause is employed. In
either event the lessee reserves the option to escape all obligation
under the lease, whether to drill or to-pay, when in his judgment
the.value of the property no longer justifies either of the alterna-
tive stipulations. Seventh, if the affirmative "drill or pay" clause is
employed, a provision for forfeiture in favor of the lessor for
breach of these conditions is usually added. If, on the other hand,
the "unless" clause is utilized, the lease terminates ipso facto upon
failure to drill or, in the alternative, to pay.
As a result of this situation, the relative rights and obligations
of the lessor and the lessee are directly adapted to the peculiar con-
ditions under which the industry must be conducted, if it is to be
permanently prosecuted. By this method the lessee obtains the
right to explore when explorations are justified, and the right to
abandon the enterprise without further liability when prudence dic-
tates that course. The lessor, on the other hand, obtains these ad-
vantages: A cash consideration for his lease equivalent to the pros-
pective value of his lands for oil-and gas purposes, although in fact
they may possess no value whatever to the lessee. The lease termi-
nates within a definite time unless production is realized. Moreover,
he receives a periodical money payment for *such portion of the
fixed term of his lease as the instrument, at the option of the lessee,
continues in force. These important considerations must be borne
in mind persistently during our consideration of the cases.
(2) Interpretation of the Lease.
Nowhere in this inquiry is it more important to persist in the
point of view that there is a marked contrast in purpose between
the leases of the earlier and later periods just alluded to than when
we are called upon to examine the peculiar rules of construction
which -are applied to oil and gas leases. On principle there is no
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persuasive reason which demands the interpretation of these grants
in a manner essentially different from the interpretation of any
other contract. The novel rule of construction which features these
instruments is that they should be strictly construed against the les-
see and in favor of the lessor. The rule so stated prevails univer-
sally.8 It is sometimes stated thus:
"Oil and gas leases are construed strongly against the
lessee and in favor of the lessor. * * * Ordinarily, oil and
gas leases are executed for the purpose of exploration and
operation for oil and gas, and where its terms will permit
it under the rules of law, such leases will be construed so as
to promote development and prevent delay and unproduc-
tiveness."O
The general doctrine is so deeply imbedded in the authorities that
the only course open to us is to ascertain its true limitations.
In a pioneer Pennsylvania case it is said:
"Perhaps in no other business is prompt performance of
contracts so essential to the rights of the parties or delay by
one party likely to prove so injurious to the other."1 0
Most of the Pennsylvania decisions involve early leases, and the
doctrine of Munroe v. Armstrong finds constant reiteration in that
jurisdiction." In an early Federal case originating in West Vir-
ginia it is again said:
a Kennedy v. Crawford, 138 Pa. s6r, 2z AtL 19 (189x); -Wertern Penna. Gas Co. T.
George, 161 Pa. 47, 28 AtI. 1004 (1894); Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. 128,
89 At]. 823 (29x4); Bettman v. Harness, 43 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (0896); Steel-
smith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898); Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn
Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. E. 923 (1899); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas
Co., 5 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902); Erie Crawford Co. v. Meeks, 40 Ind. App.
z56, 8z N. E. 58 (7o0); Dittmzan v. Keller, 55 Ind. App. 448, xo4 N. E. 40 (1914);.
Ohio Oil Co. v. Burch, 124 N. E. (Ind., 1919) 781; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La.
178, 62 So. 623 (1913); Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 235 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914);
Rechard v. Cowley, 8o So. (Ala., 1918) 419; Arrnitage v. Mt. Sterling Oil & Gas Co.,
25 Ken. L. Rep. 2262, 80 S. W. 177 (1904); Aycock v. Reliance Oil Co., 200 S, W.
(Tex., 0909) 848; Superior Oil Co. v. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 108 Pac. 545 (191o);
Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, xxo Pac. 902 (1910); Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview
Gas Co., 29 Okla. 719, 119 Pac. 260 (191i); Bearman v. Dux Oil & Ga Co., 166 Pac.
,(Okla., 1917) 199; Jameson v. Chanslor Oil Co., 176 Cal. 1, 167 Pac. 369 (1917).
,sParish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., so W. Va. 583, supra; Paraffine Oil
Co. v. Cruce, z62 Pac. (Okla., x9x6) 7x6; New State Oil & Gas Co. v. Dunn, 182 PaC.
(Oka., 1919) 514; Curtis v. Harris, z84 Pac. (Okla., 2909) 574.
19 Munroe v. Arnstrang, g6 Pa. St. 307 (o88o).
u'Allison's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 221 (r874); Brown v. Vandergrift, So Pa. St. 142
(1875); Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. 491, x6 Atl. 474 (1889); Brushwood Developing
Co. v. Hickey, z6 At1. (Pa., .888) 70; Western Penna. Gas Co. v. George, 161 Pa. 47,
28 At. 1004 (0894); Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502. 35 AtL. (z896) xo9. I
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"There is perhaps no other 'business in which prompt
performance is so essential to the rights of the parties or
delay so likely to prove injurious-no other class of con-
tracts in which time is so much of the essence. There is no
other branch of mining where greater damage is done by
delay. Coal and precious metals lie either in horizontal
veins or in pockets. They remain where they are until re-
moved. Oil and gas are the most uncertain, fluctuating,
volatile and fugitive of all mining properties.212
The reason underlying the rule is thus stated:
"As oil is fugitive, and is not found in all lands, the com-
pensation to the lessor is almost always a royalty. It fol-
lows that all of the covenants to be performed by the lessee
which relate to the right to drill or explore for oil are con-
strued most strictly in favor of the lessor. Again, the fact
that the lessor usually gets nothing out of his lease except
the royalty it yields after oil is discovered by the drill, the
presumption always is that a lease is made for the purpose
of immediate development, unless the contrary appears in
the contract of the parties."-
The Supreme Court of West Virginia, in an early decision on
this subject in that jurisdiction, holds that the controlling object
of the lessor in executing an oil and gas lease is to realize produc-
tion; that is, to obtain the benefit of the royalties which under the
early leases was the sole consideration to the lessor.14 Other ex-
pressions to the same effect aii these:
"It has been held many times that development is the cen-
tral purpose of the ordinary oil and gas lease, and that such
instruments will be construed in the light of such purpose."1 5
"The real consideration and inducement moving the con-
tracting parties to sucf contracts has been held to be, on the
part of the landowner, prospective rents and royalties, and
on the part of the gas company the right to exclude others
from the premises and the anticipated profits in vending the
products of the wells it should drill."'0
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in recent cases firmly adheres
to this doctrine:
4 Huggins v. Daley, 99 Fed. 6o6 (19oo).
2Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. 128, 89 Atl. 823 (1914).
1Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896).
5Dittman v. Keller, 55 Ind. App. 448, 104 N. E. 40 (1914).
"Piftsburgh-Columbia Oil Co. v. Broyles, 46 Ind. App. R. 3, 91 N. E. 7S4 (1910).
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"Ordinarily, oil and gas leases are executed for the pur-
pose of exploring and operating for oil and gas, and where
its terms will permit it, under the rules of law, such lease
will be construed so as to promote development and prevent
delay and unproductiveness."17
Without citing the many cases of similar import, it is plain that
the rule is founded on two reasons: first, that because of the fugi-
tive propensity of the subject-matter, prompt development is nec-
essary to protect the lessor against drainage; second, that prompt
development is essential in order to yield the lessor the sole or con-
trolling consideration for the grant-namely, the royalties which
are contingent on production.
Discussing the reasons which underlie the rule, we must now
briefly refer to what wassaid when the fugacious character of oil
and gas was under. consideration. It was there pointed out that
while oil and gas in their natural state do not migrate, the courts
in all the early cases, and in many of the more recent decisions, pro-
ceed upon the assumption that oil and gas in a state of nature have
the power of self-movement. The quotations from Munroe v.
Armstrong and Huggins v. Daley are clearly predicated upon that
belief. When, however, drainage is possible only when there are
opdrations on adjacent lands, there is no occasion for the applica-
tion of the rule upon this ground solely in the absence of a showing
of drainage by neighboring wells. Even then the principle, as a
mere rule of construction, is untenable, because there is a more
important and definite principle to protect the lessor; that is, the
reading of an implied covenant or condition into the lease, opera-
tive at all times and under all conditions, which 'binds the lessee to
protect the land from drainage. Moreover, the application of the
rule should be relaxed when it is invoked upbn the second ground,
that the lessor is entitled to prompt development in order that he
may realize the sole or controlling consideration. for the lease-
namely, the royalties. We say this because, as .the business is now
conducted and as the leases are now written, no greater importance
should be attached to the prospective royalties as the moving con-
sideration for the lease than to the bonus, which .represents the value
of the leasehold at the time it was created, and which, supplemented
by the stipulated rentals, was largely the inducement for its exe-
cution.
"New State Oil & Gas Co. v. Dunn, z82 Pac. (Okla., igxg) 5r4; Parafne Oil Co. v.
Cruce, x62 Pac. (Okla., 1916) 7x6; Curtis v. Harris, 184 Pac. (Okla., x919) 574.
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In contrast with the early holdings, the courts in their recent
decisions are clearly responding to the doctrine that where the par-
ties to the lease in plain terms have fixed the measure of diligence
to be exercised by the leasee in the development of the property the
contract will be construed as other contracts are construed and in
accordance with the plain intent of the parties. In a comparatively
recent Kansas case it is said:
"Courts have no right to declare that, whatever the par-
ties may think, operations for sinking a -vell must begin at
once under an oil and gas lease. If this court had done so
prior to the time plaintiffs desired to contract they would
have rebelled, without any doubt, with the utmost indigna-
tion, against the decision as an infringement of their liberty
to contract with reference to their land and the minerals
beneath its surface as they pleased.' In so doing they would
have been justified. If plaintiffs should desire to contract
for immediate exploration they must have that right, and if
they should desire to give an oil or gas company five yearg
in which to sink a well upon a consideration satisfactory to
themselves, and as the result of negotiations free from impo-
sition of fraud, they must have that right; but having delib-
erately made a contract of the latter description, they have
no right to call upon a court to declare that it is of the other
kind merely because, generally, it might seem to -be better
for farmers not to encumber their lands with miniral leases
giving a long time for exploration, or because, generally, such
leases do contemplate that forfeiture shall follow a violation
to explore at once." Is
When a modem *oil lease of the type .already alluded to is under
.consideration this is now the consistent holding of the courts.19 In a
well-considered" West Virginia case, where damages were sought
Is Rose y. Lonyon Zinc Co,. 68 Kans. 126, 74 Pac. 625 (19o3).
"Ringle - Quigg, 74 Kan. 5z, 80 Pac. 724 (0go6).; Collier v. Monger, 75 Kana.
Se. 80 Pac. loll (19o7): Brew.4er v. Lan-vnn Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 8nx (1os): Phillips
v. Hamilton. 17 Wyo. Al. 95 PaC. '846 (zooS): Cohn v. Clark. 48 Okla. qoo. 1.o Pac.
467 09r); Brennan v. Hunter, z2 Pac. (Okla.. 191S) 49: Northwestern Oil & Gas
C. v. Bronine. 17. Pac. (Okla.. :g8) .3.: Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla., zg:8)
$7.-Beatty v. Eastern Oil Co., 177 Pac. (Ola.. 1018) 104: .ameson v. Chancellor Oil
CO., 176 C41. z. z67 Pac. 36 (1g1)": Stoddard v. Ener-V, z8 Pa. 4.46, z8 AtL 339
(k88!); McMillan v. Philadelphia CO.. 1so Pa. 142. 28 AtL 22o (1893): Colgan v.
Foresi Oil Co.. 194 Pa. 234. as At. zig 6899): Young v. Forest Oil Co., x94 Pa. 243,
As At. 1a (899); Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffey. .9z W. VA. 88. 43 S. E. 101 (903);
South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438. 76 S. E. 961 (igiz): Petty v. United
Fuel Ga Co., 76 W. Va. a68. 8.s S. E. 523 (zois): Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co.,
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by a lessor for the alleged breach of a covenant to drill, regardless
of the fact that the lease contained a rental clause for deferred drill-
ing, the court said:
"In so far as right of recovery is asserted in the declara-
tion and evidence, on the groimd of duty to drill, merely be-
cause the premises are shown to be gas-producing territory,
the case is obviously bad. By their written lease, the Plain-
tiffs expressly assented to delay in drilling, and agreed to
accept in satisfaction thereof specified pecuniary compensa-
tion, which has been paid. In other words, they took a con-
ditional covenant from the lessee to complete a well within
a specified period, or pay periodically, in lieu thereof, stipu-
lated sums of money, and provided a like option for the les-
see as to subsequent successive periods of like length. The
lessee having elected to pay the money instead of drilling, as
it was expressly authorized to do, the lessees have accepted
it. To permit them now to recover damages for an omission
to which they have assented, and for which they have been
compensated according to a standard or measure fixed by
their own solemn contract, would violate a fundamental prin-
ciple of the law of contracts. However obvious the adapt-
ability of their land to successful mining operation and min-
eral production may have become by developments on neigh-
boring lands, they have suffered no denial of right except
delay to which they have assented. They still have their gas,
and have been compensated for the delay.1
20
While it seems reasonably clear that it is now the settled rule
that the measure of diligence to be exercised by an oil lessee should
be determined from the express provisions of the lease alone, the
latent influence of this earlier principle of construction still abides
in some of the jurisdictions. This point may be illustrated by re-
citing the history of the question in Oklahoma. In. one of the first
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, after statehood,
the rule is laid down that an oil lease should be strictly construed
in favor of the lessor and against the lessee.21 The rule was then
8o W. Va. i87. 94 S. E. 472 (z9p): Poe V. Ulrey. 2. . IlL 6. 84 N. E. 46 (tgog);
Syahl V. Blinois Oil Co., 45 Ind. App. 211, 90 N. E. 632 (191o); Dittman Y. Keller,
ss Ind. App. 448. Ind N. E. 40 (xgx4.: Grubb v. McAfee. 2x2 S. W. (Tex.. xxg) 464;
Durnawav v. Galbraith. 214 S. W. (Ark.. 9ig) 32.; Rechard v. Cowley, go So. (AL.,
i9z8) 419.
Carper v. United Fuel Gas Cn.. 78 W. Va. 4.3. 80 S. E. 12 (9l.
Superior Oil Ch. v. Afehlin. 2s Okla. 809. Ing Fac. 54.5 (1o0).
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restated in two later cases. 22  In Brown v. Wilson, and largely
under the authority of this principle, an oil and gas lease was can-
celed which under the overwhelming weight of authority elsewhere
would have been upheld.23  Then in Beariman v. Dux Oil & Gas
Company24 we find an extreme application of the rule. Here a lease
was involved which did not require the payment of the stipulated
yearly rental in advance. In such circumstances the overwhelming
weight of authority supports the proposition that the rental might
be paid at any time during the year. In this case, and by virtue of
this far-reaching canon of construction alone, the court held that
the rental was payable in advance, and the lease was canceled be-
cause the payment was not so made. A mere rule of construction
was permitted to overturn the plain and unambiguous language of
the contract. The doctrine of Brozon v. Wilson was so vigorously
assailed by the bar of the state and so unfounded in -both principle
and authority that the court in a series of well-reasoned cases over-
ruled Brown v. Wilson and held'in effect that the measure of dili-
gence to be exercised by the lessee should be found in the terms of
the lease.25 Notwithstanding this posture of the cases, which seems
to confine the rule to its proper limits, we then find that court in
'two later cases resurrecting the principle by this declaration:
"Ordinarily, oil and gas leases are executed for the pur-
pose of exploration and operation -for oil and gas, and where
its terms will permit it under the rules of law such lease will
be construed so as to. promote development and -prevent
delay and unproductiveness."-
We have already seen that the courts take judicial notice of the
.general conditions under which lands are leased for oil.27 In Okla-
homa, as elsewhere in the oil-producing states, oil is produced in
comparatively few counties, although the state leads in oil produc-
.tion*, but nearly every acre in the state has prospective value for oil
purposes, and practically all of the lands of the state are covered
by oil and gas leases. These leases are on the "drill or pay" form
2 Kolachney v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110 PaC. 902 (1910); Frank Oil Co. v.
Beleve Gat CO.. 20 Okla. 719. 139 Pac. 260 (loll).
=Brown v. WiLron. q8 Okla. .92. 16o Pa=. 9A (xo6).
"Bearman a. x Oil ,ga Cn, 166 Pac. (Okla.. 1917) 199.
2' Brenn nv.'THunter, 372 Pac. (Okla., x918) 49; Northwestern Oil & Gas Co. v.
Branine, 17.5 Pac. (Okla.. x~x8) .933: Rich v. Doneohey, 177 Pac. (Okla.. 1918) 87;
Bea~fy v. Eastern Oil Co., 177 PAc. (Okla., 1g1S) 104.
3'New State Oil & Gas Co. v. Dunn, x8A2 Pac. (0kla., i939) 514; Curtis v. Harris,
284 Pac. (Okla., 3939) 574.
2Beftman v. Harness, 42 W-- Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896).
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and are held to abide neighboring developments in the future. This
situation is as clearly understood -by the lessors as it is by the les-
sees. The industry cannot contemplate the drilling of a substantial
proportion of the leases taken, not to. say every lease. Complete
disaster would attend such a course. Not only was the Oklahoma
court charged with judicial notice of- this state of affairs, but the
condition was of such notoriety that the court, in point of fact, was
apprised of the situation. Notwithstanding the important practical
bearing of the entire matter and the vast property interests involved,
we again find these considerations falling before this ancient rule
which, in modem oil and gas law, can have little, if any, application.
Finally, then, and although the exact attitude of the cases is
somewhat obscured by the inconsistent utterances of the courts, this
conclusion is justified: The rule that an oil and gas lease should
be construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee so as ,to
promote development and prevent delay may apply in the early cases,
where the courts entertained the notion that a lessor would lose a
portion of his oil unless there was speedy development, even though
there was no drainage by neighboring wells. Also for the reason
that in those cases the only consideration moving to the lessor was
a royalty which was not realized unless operations were conducted.
Neither of these foundations for the rule obtain with respect to the
modem oil lease. The royalty is no longer the sole or even con-
trolling consideration for the lease. The question of impending
drainage does not enter into the matter, because, in the absence of
adjacent wells, there is no drainage, and when drainage occurs the
lessor has his protection not by virtue of this principle of constrtic-
tion but under the implied covenant of -the lease. Therefore, the
oil lease of today, with respect to the degree of diligence to be ex-
ercised by the lessee, is to be interpreted according to the plain im-
port of the terms of the lease which fix this obligation.
As an incident to the question, reference should be made to the
rule that prevails in some of the jurisdictions, that where there is
an ambiguity in a lease the principle of construction applicable to
insurance policies should be applied, because the leases are prepared
by lessees experienced in the business, while the lessors are not.28
To emphasize the limitation on this rule, however, it is held in
West Virginia that where the lessor instead of the lessee prepares
" Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (896); Ohio Oil Co. v. Burch,
i-z4 N. E. (Ind., 1979) 781; Letherman v. Oliver, 1S1 Pa. 646, 2s AtI. 309 (x89z); Hop-
kins v. Zeigler, 259 Fed. 43 (1919).
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the lease the doctrine does not apply.29 Owing to the fact that grants
of this character are frequently ambiguous in their provisions, the
familiar rule that the courts will adopt the construction placed upon
the instrument by the parties is frequently applied. 0 Then, again,
most of the leases taken are on printed forms, and in the negotia-
tions between the parties the printed form is frequently modified or
added to by written or typewritten provisions, and in this situation
the courts ofttimes have been called upon to announce the rule that
where there is a conflict between the written and the printed parts
the former controls.3 '
JAMzS A. V4ASzY.
Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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